Hermeneutical Posts of Interest

A couple of insightful hermeneutical posts by Cynthia Nielsen where Yours Truly has provided some extremely dis/interesting commentary....

Cynthia explores Benson Benson's analogy between hermeneutics and the improvisation found in music:
Musical Hermeneutics
Here is the article by Cynthia on her blog discussing Echeverria's article on Gadamer:
Is Gadamer a Relativist?

Bruce Ellis Benson "The Improvisation of Hermeneutics"

I would like to begin by way of a personal example. I have over the past few years began to seriously question whether or not “biblical interpretation” should be taught. I have a small Bible study discussion group that meets on Sunday mornings at our church. I have thought, on several occasions, that it would be good to teach a class on interpretation. And yet as I contemplated this I realized that each time we opened our Bibles on Sunday morning to study we were conducting a biblical interpretations class – and we were doing it quite well! Without even realizing it we were all becoming better interpreters of the Bible because we were all doing interpretation. Furthermore, upon reflecting upon Benson’s piece I believe it may be possible to stifle the process of biblical interpretation by putting in place rules and regulations, which unnecessarily burden the sincere seeker. There must be room for imagination in interpretation. Or, as Benson puts it, “improvisation.”

Benson’s essay, "The Improvisation of Hermeneutics" is the opening act in Part 4 of Hermeneutics at the Crossroads. He specifically addresses some of the ethical concerns of hermeneutics. Benson states in the conclusion: “My concern here is a deeply ethical one. If the author should not die so that the reader may live, then neither should the reader have to die so that the author may live…As interpreters, we owe much to authors and their texts. But authors and texts are – if not equally – at least clearly dependent upon interpreters and interpretive communities.” (205) This quote echoes Benson’s refusal to give a privilege to either author, text, or interpreter in the hermeneutical process. Rather, what interpretation is is the result of an improvisational moment similar to that of a jazz performance: “The typical way in which jazz pieces are performed is that the “head” or melody is stated, then succeeding choruses improvise upon it, and then the performance concludes with a restatement of that melody…The further one can go – and still remain in touch with the piece’s structure – the better the improviser one is.” (206)

An improvisational model of hermeneutics, as Benson develops it, would seek to do justice to both the author, the text, and the interpretive community. (194) This is not merely a license for play on the part of the reader. For example, Benson comments on a Scriptural hermeneutic: “A pastor is not allowed to ‘improvise’ on 1 Corinthians for a sermon in the same way that Paul was ‘allowed’ to improvise on Old Testament and early Christian texts in composing 1 Corinthians. There are ways in which an improvisation can be deemed ‘faithful’ to a text and ways in which it can be deemed ‘unfaithful.’” (205) As such, it is improvisation “all the way down” including on the part of the author. Benson puts the author and reader alike in a process of improvisation. In fact, “It is safe to say that in jazz the roles of composer and performer are so clearly interwoven that a clear distinction between the two is significantly complicated – even though there is still a distinction.” (197) Hence in jazz improvisation is actually the intention of the composer. (198) In my view these thoughts of Benson’s go to an essential hermeneutical point: Interpretation can never be strictly defined in advance. Interpretation must always make room for revision. This goes back to my point in the opening paragraph regarding the learning of hermeneutics. Rules are helpful for learning hermeneutics, but they must always be held with an open hand. This is true even in the case of Scriptural interpretation. One might think that after all of these years of interpretation we would finally have the correct interpretation, and many in Christian circles would make this claim, but each community and even each individual must make an interpretive decision, and this is a decision that can only be relevant if it is actually made in a moment of decision and not simply a moment of rote repetition. And this only become a conscious and relevant decision if it is one that an individual has learned to make by the actual doing of interpretation.

Regarding these last few thoughts Benson actually echoes this on pages 202-03 and brings in Derrida (and then Hirsch): “Attempting to determine what ‘the piece has to say’ or ‘the text has to say’ is not merely a matter of playing the ‘right’ notes or reading the words…Earlier we mentioned Derrida’s conception of a ‘doubling commentary’ that acts as a ‘guardrail’ for the text. While Derrida clearly thinks such a commentary is important, he also thinks that this ‘doubling’ is possible only to a limited extent. For even in doubling there is already an improvisatory moment.” (202) So, improvisation is required even if we want to be most true to the author and the text: “Even when we try to be mere ‘imitators’ or provide ‘literal’ translations of texts, those imitations and translations invariably go beyond the text.” (203)

Finally, I would like to highlight a question that Benson raises regarding the relationship between “improvisation” and the text itself. For Benson the relationship is not one that is simply stated. His view seems to be the last of three options: “Performance practice actually affects the very identity of the piece, not in the weak sense of bringing out possibilities but in the strong sens of actually ‘creating’ (or, rather, improvising) them.” (204) Admittedly, this “complicates” things a bit. Specifically, it complicates the identity of the piece/text. “The piece becomes in effect a historical entity that is affected by subsequent interpretations. On this account, the identity of the piece may subtly change over time, even though its identity would still be continuous. In such a case, its identity would be similar to many other historical entities, such as human persons, who retain their identity despite mental and physical changes.” (204) Benson points to a dramatic example of this in the composition of Round Midnight, which was composed and altered by several performers, including Thelonious Monk, Cootie Williams, Dizzy Gillespie and Miles Davis. (204, 196-97)

For many of us talk about a text changing over time causes us to cringe a bit. However, this is a good cringe, I think. It goes to the importance of preserving the integrity of the text and of the responsibility readers have to the text and the author. However, what I appreciate about Benson’s perspective is the refusal to oversimplify the interpretive process. Benson’s insightful essay effectively utilizes analogies from the improvisation in jazz to provide a very general model and goal for hermeneutics – a process of creativity that continually re-evaluates itself in order to carefully preserve the rights of the author, text, and reader and act in an ethical and just way to all of those who are shareholders in the hermeneutical moment.


Citation: Bruce Ellis Benson, “The Improvisation of Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, James K.A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).

Other essays reviewed in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads:
Bruce Ellis Benson "The Improvisation of Hermeneutics"
James K.A. Smith "Limited Inc/arnation"
Kevin Vanhoozer "Discourse on Matter"
Nicholas Wolterstorff "Resuscitating the Author"

James K.A. Smith "Limited Inc/arnation"

James K.A. Smith attempts in his essay “Limited Inc/arnation” to engage Derrida and suggests that some of Derrida’s concepts may be useful for a Christian hermeneutic. This, of course, is a very bold move!

Smith states his intentions at the outset:
I will demonstrate (1) that Derrida’s account of the “iterability” of the sign is consistent with the finitude of a good creation, and (2) that Derrida’s account does not jettison the role of authorial intent, but only mitigates the power of the author to “govern” all interpretations. (113)

Smith claims that Derrida has been misread. Rather than claiming that seeking authorial intent is irrelevant, Smith proposes that Derrida (through his notion of “iterability” and “context”) is primarily pointing out the risk involved in communication. Derrida’s notions of “iterability” and “context” ultimately reveal that the text becomes “unhitched” from its original context. (See my more detailed review for more on “iterability” and “context”)

Smith has great respect for Authorship and states at the outset of his essay that this is an issue that must be seriously engaged within the Christian tradition. What Smith does throughout the essay is to situate the determination of authorial intent within the Christian community under the guide of the Holy Spirit. In this way, the hermeneutical question is a community question as much as it is an appeal to the mysterious concept of “authorial intent.”

My primary response to Smith’s essay is to applaud. It is truly important to engage the perspective of Derrida. Regardless of one’s conclusion on the value of Derrida it seems, to me, to be of great value to give him a reading rather than merely fixing a label on him and allowing the issue to drop out of sight and out of mind.

But if we agree with Smith on his more mild construction of Derrida, then what are the real consequences for hermeneutics? In other words, if we alter the “received” Derrida tradition, then what contribution is made with the softer Derrida? What is so impressive?

In answering this question it would seem to me that Derrida’s contribution lies in his emphasis on the unstable nature of communication. Writing and language is risky business, and for Derrida this seems to be the point of emphasis. Perhaps in the past biblical interpretation has been somewhat naïve about interpretation and has tended to view interpretation for its stability rather than its instability: To view language as something more fixed and scientific, rather than viewing it as fluid and artistic. Hence, in this sense Derrida (and others who stand with him in a loose collective of the philosophical hermeneutics tradition) proves to be a corrective.

Additionally, even with this so-called “softer” Derrida, there is still much for Christian interpreters to gripe about. For example, if we “unhitch” the text from authorial intent and situate interpretation in the community, then how do we ever actually recover the authors intent or ever actually fix or find the meaning.

Smith, himself raises this question, but the answer, I think, on a Derridean account is unclear. On Smith’s account there is an appeal to the community and to the Holy Spirit’s work in the community. This is the “fixer” of meaning. However, for those looking for something more “stable” this essay will not suffice. Again, this goes back to the issue of the extent to which we view language as stable or unstable – fixed or fluid. Above all, Smith via Derrida in this essay want to dispel the illusion that “authorial intent” are magic words that fix meaning. Put another way, Smith/Derrida warn against construing fixed formulas that guarantee the stability of language and hence the stability of interpretation. Interpretation is difficult because signs, writing, and language are themselves unstable.

Although being in agreement with this point, I would offer up the fact that “authorial intent” nonetheless must always remain a goal of interpretation, at least in most cases. As I have mentioned before there are certainly texts in which authorial intent may be less important (certain poetic or prophetic texts, perhaps), but authorial intent will always be important, if not critical to biblical interpretation. On this Smith would agree – at least he seems to in his opening paragraphs. So, if “authorial intent” is not a magic formula, it is, at least, a goal and still one of the important staples of interpretation.

Lastly, I think that by insisting that biblical interpretation be situated more in the community we are doing interpretation a great favor. Community determination will, of necessity, take on greater dialogue. And this dialogue, if it is to be truly productive as any dialogue should be, must be both stimulating and generous at the same time. It must be challenging as well as charitable, it must be rigorous while maintaining humility. This type of dialogue will carry with it uncertainties and unrest, but if it is successful it has enormous potential for interpretive stimulation. And, I think, it is this kind of dialogue and stimulation that will move us closer to our stated goals of interpretation, including that of “authorial intent.”


To view a more expanded form of my attempt to discern the authorial intention of Smith's essay please go to: http://erdman31.googlepages.com/Smith-LimitedIncarnation.pdf

Citation: James K.A. Smith, “Limited Inc/arnation” in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, James K.A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).




Other essays reviewed in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads:
Bruce Ellis Benson "The Improvisation of Hermeneutics"
James K.A. Smith "Limited Inc/arnation"
Kevin Vanhoozer "Discourse on Matter"
Nicholas Wolterstorff "Resuscitating the Author"

An engagement with Nicholas Wolterstorff "Resuscitating the Author"

Nicholas Wolterstorff
“Resuscitating the Author”
Hermeneutics at the Crossroads
Chapter 2, Pages 35-50
2006

Resuscitating the author, while rejecting “authorial intent”

Wolterstorff begins by distancing himself from the text and drawing closer to the author of the text:

My claim will be that...most of the time all of us practice one, that is basic to almost all other kinds of interpretation, and that this kind of interpretation, rather than consisting at bottom of things done to an artifact, consists of an engagement with a person, which is mediated by the artifact. (36)

This move by Wolterstorff sets the tone for the essay. He is critical of the move by Gadamer and those subsequent to Gadamer who moved away from the author. He speaks of this as hermeneutical “orthodoxy,” which Wolterstorff notes was reactionary:

The orthodoxy in question arose as a reaction to the view that the interpretation of texts is at bottom an engagement with the person who authored the text, in that way, my view is a recovery of what preceded the formation of orthodoxy. But I join with orthodoxy in rejecting what the pre-orthodox said it was that we try to discover and understand when we interpret; that is to say, I hold that our mode of engagement with the author, when we interpret, is different from the pre-orthodox thought it was. They held that its goal is to get at the authorizer’s intention; I hold that its goal is to get at what the authorizer said. Those two, I argue, are not to be identified with each other. (36-37)

Wolterstorff’s first move – to recover the author (“an engagement with a person”) – seems clear enough, particularly throughout the essay as he criticizes the hermeneutics that has moved away from the author and into the text. But it is much more difficult to discern what Wolterstorff means when differentiates “the authorizer’s intentions” and “what the authorizer said.” Wolterstorff criticizes those who seek “the authorizer’s intentions.” But if Wolterstorff moves away from “intentions,” isn’t he moving away from the author, at least in some way? From Wolterstorff’s essay it is difficult to see how he can criticize a focus on authorial intent and at the same time can speak of interpretation as “an engagement with a person.” We will see, later, how Wolterstorff brings this together.

Criticism of “hermeneutic orthodoxy”

Wolterstorff then criticizes those who move away from the author and towards a focus upon the text, itself. He describes the move away from the author and towards the text as “hermeneutic orthodoxy”:

What is it, according to the hermeneutic orthodoxy of the latter half of the twentieth century, that the interpreter should aim at?…interpretation deals with texts rather than persons…the meaning, or the sense, of the text…Textual-sense interpretation, as I call it, has been the orthodoxy of pre-deconstructionist twentieth-century interpretation theory…(italics belong to the author) (38)

That which one understands, when one understands a text, is not “a repetition of something past” but “a present meaning” shared between author and interpreter. It is, if you will, an ever-present meaning. (39)

It is not really a relationship between persons, between the reader and the author (who is, perhaps quite unknown), but about sharing in what the text shares with us. (40)

For Ricoeur, as for Gadamer, the central goal of interpretation is to identify and grasp the meanings of the sentences of the text…we can just as well say that the goal of interpretation is to identify and grasp the propositional content of the illocutionary act. (41)

Wolterstorff then levels his major charge against those who detach the text from the author:

If we insist on leaving authors out of the picture, and taking the text in itself as the object of interpretation, then I think textual-sense interpretation cannot but give way to performance interpretation; there is no way to stop the slide. (46)

Wolterstorff explains that “performance interpretation” is what happens when “one imagines what some French writer of the early twentieth century might have meant had he produced the text of Don Quixote…what some writer of Kantian persuasion might have meant had he produced the text of the Prologue of John’s Gospel…” (46)

But this is a point that I am not entirely clear on. How is it that a move to the text, as Wolterstorff has described of Gadamer, can give way to this sort-of radicalization. Wolterstorff clearly seems to be presenting some form of the “slippery slope” argument, but he is not as clear as to how a focus on the text takes us down this slippery slope.

(The thing about slippery slope arguments is that one must clearly demonstrate the how a position takes one down the slope, and cannot merely assert that such is the case. After all, if we all began to use the slippery slope argument without substantiation this would take us down a slippery slope, indeed!)

The point is simply that I did not find Wolterstorff convincing that the hermeneutic of Gadamer/Ricoeur would take us into the so-called “performance interpretation.”

Wolterstorff’s alternative: “Authorial Discourse Interpretation”

Wolterstorff is now ready to focus on his alternative to “authorial intent” and “hermeneutic orthodoxy”:

My contention is that none of us practices performance interpretation most of the time…46
The mode of interpretation that most of us practice most of the time is that which Derrida is calling for on the part of those who interpret his writings. I call it authorial discourse interpretation. In authorial discourse interpretation one seeks to identify and grasp the illocutionary acts that the authorizer of the text performed by inscribing, or in some other way authorizing, the words that one is interpreting. (italics belong to the author) (47)

So, Wolterstorff’s alternative is “authorial discourse interpretation.” This is intimately tied to the illocutionary acts. What are these “illocutionary acts”? Wolterstorff does not really explain in this essay, and there is a bit of ambiguity as to the precise nature of an illocutionary act. However, it would have aided Wolterstorff’s essay immensely to define how he is using the term illocutionary act, since to my knowledge there is still some ambiguity attached to this term and it has been used with slightly different nuance in varying contexts.

By outlining his authorial discourse interpretation Wolterstorff wants to distance himself from “hermeneutic orthodoxy” while at the same time avoiding the “pre-orthodoxy” mistake of focusing strictly on authorial intent.

But despite his distance from authorial intent, Wolterstorff does make one qualification on authorial intent:

These observations lead me to attach an explanatory qualification to my main thesis, however. Sometimes, when it is clear to us that what the author said is not what he intended to say, our interest is more in what he intended to say than on what he did say. (48-49)

In his conclusion, Wolterstorff takes note of what he believes are ethical implications of interpretation:

My account of interpretation has important ethical implications. If the interpretation that most of us perform most of the time consists of engaging a person rather than just doing something to an artifact, then the issue arises of whether we have engaged that person justly, charitably, honorably, and the like. (49)

There do certainly seem to be ethical implications to Wolterstorff’s theory of interpretation, but this seems to be the case only if we tie the text so close to the author that a violation of the text represents a violation of the author of the text. But surely this cannot always be the case. A person who, unwittingly misunderstands and thus misrepresents my writing does not seem to be violating any higher order moral value. And perhaps it is for this reason that Wolterstorff speaks of acting “charitably” or “honorably.” Rather than having an ethical obligation to interpret correctly, it would seem the ethical obligation is to simply do one’s best to interpret. But does the author have a similar obligation in communicating? What if an author has not done his or her best to communicate? In my opinion it may get complicated to start to assign ethical obligations to readers and authors. This is not a reason to shy away from it, however, because most of the time the assignment of ethical obligations gets complicated!


Engaging Wolterstorff: What is the issue? The author and the text.

What emerges from this insightful essay of Wolterstorff’s are questions of interpretation. More specifically, the questions center on how closely the text is tied to the author. On the one hand, it seems clear that once the text is written it is detached, in some way, from the author. The author can no longer control it. The author will even be physically detached from his or her text. (Especially if said author is deceased.) The text may even undergo revisions and translations that alter it in insubstantial ways. Furthermore, the author may not even completely understand the text after having written it. Imagine authoring a text at the age of 18 and then revisiting the text 50 years later. Would the author recognize his or her work, anymore? Would they be able to “transport” themselves back 50 years into their mind-set and be able to discern their “intentions.” In all likelihood they would not!

Furthermore, imagine a scenario in which an author pens a powerful and insightful text and does so with great thought and care. Because it is such an original and penetrating text it is studied for generations on end by the brilliant scholars of each age. Is it not conceivable in this scenario that those who study it in later generations might have a better understanding of the text than the author? Perhaps those of later generations would be able to detect nuances and subtleties that the author missed? Or perhaps they would better understand the historical situation of the text even better than the author?

But we can even move this scenario into everyday life. If a child writes a summary of the days events in their diary would it really be so inconceivable that an insightful parent might not better understand the text than the child, themselves? Is it inconceivable that someone more familiar with the issues I am raising in this text might better understand it than myself, its author?

For all of the above reasons it seems as though the text exists as its own entity. Readers can take ownership of it and, to some degree, it becomes their playground. However, does this mean that we can completely detach the text from the author? I think not. As I review my own text above I note that in one place I state in parentheses that “Italics belong to the author.” Why do we do this if not for the fact that at some level we recognize that the text is a creation, and that every creation has a creator.

God created. He created his world. But his world is now detached. Perhaps in some way this mirrors the fact that every text belongs to the creative ingenuity of the author and yet the author must relinquish the text. The text becomes its own, and yet it always remains a created entity, a creation of the author.

Citation:Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Resuscitating the Author” in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, James K.A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).


Other essays reviewed in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads:
Bruce Ellis Benson "The Improvisation of Hermeneutics"
James K.A. Smith "Limited Inc/arnation"
Kevin Vanhoozer "Discourse on Matter"
Nicholas Wolterstorff "Resuscitating the Author"

Kevin Vanhoozer - "Discourse on Matter"

Kevin Vanhoozer is an editor of a new collection of essay's on hermeneutics. His essay is particularly fascinating and I have interacted with it in depth here:
http://erdman31.googlepages.com/Review-Vanhoozer-DiscourseonMatter.pdf

Here is my brief summary of Vanhoozer's article:
Vanhoozer raises a critical question for hermeneutics and biblical interpretation: To what extent are we active in the process of interpretation, and to what extent are we passive? Another way of putting the question is: Is interpreting the biblical text something I have control of, or is there a more mystical and intangible element at work. The intangible element is represented by the school of philosophical hermeneutics.Vanhoozer shows that philosophical hermeneutics, represented particularly by Hans-Georg Gadamer, appeals to a mystical or even a “miracle” element in the nature of understanding. Vanhoozer takes seriously the contribution of philosophical hermeneutics and finds a similarity with the thinking of Karl Barth. Vanhoozer, however, adds a distinctively Christian twist to what he perceives as secular hermeneutics. The twist is that rather than appealing to the mystical or the miracle element, as Gadamer had done, Vanhoozer employs Christian theological categories like “grace,” “illumination,” and the activity of being “in Christ.”

Here are the first few paragraphs from my in-depth interaction that I noted above:
I find Vanhoozer’s recent essay on understanding to be a very critical and important work for hermeneutics in general and for biblical studies in particular. Vanhoozer raises a fundamental question for interpretation and understanding, a question that has been kicking around here and there for the past century or so in one way or another amongst scholars and academics, not the least of which are the likes of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Barth. Vanhoozer clearly articulates this question and seeks to explore the answer within a distinctively Christian framework.

The question goes as follows: “Is understanding a type of active mastery or a passive happening? Is it something the interpreting subject does, or is understanding done to the interpreter by the subject matter."

This has been a critical question in my mind for several years and I believe it has critical ramifications for biblical studies on all levels: from the most erudite and academic considerations to the most practical interactions of pastors and teachers within the local church setting. The question centers on the extent to which we as interpreters have control over the process of understanding and the extent to which we, ourselves are actually controlled by the biblical text. Are we in control of the Scripture, or do the Scriptures control us?

If we are the masters of interpretation, does this mean that biblical interpretation is strictly a matter of applying the right rules and procedures? Can we gain understanding by simply applying the right method of interpretation? Or is there something more – something intangible that is at work in this process of understanding the written Word of God?

Citation:
Kevin Vanhoozer, “Discourse on Matter: Hermeneutics and the ‘Miracle’ of Understanding,” in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, James K.A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006).



Other essays reviewed in Hermeneutics at the Crossroads:
Bruce Ellis Benson "The Improvisation of Hermeneutics"
James K.A. Smith "Limited Inc/arnation"
Kevin Vanhoozer "Discourse on Matter"
Nicholas Wolterstorff "Resuscitating the Author"